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Abstract. Failure cases of black-box deep learning, e.g. adversarial examples,
might have severe consequences in healthcare. Yet such failures are mostly stud-
ied in the context of real-world images with calibrated attacks. To demystify
the adversarial examples, rigorous studies need to be designed. Unfortunately,
complexity of the medical images hinders such study design directly from the
medical images. We hypothesize that adversarial examples might result from the
incorrect mapping of image space to the low dimensional generation manifold by
deep networks. To test the hypothesis, we simplify a complex medical problem
namely pose estimation of surgical tools into its barest form. An analytical deci-
sion boundary and exhaustive search of the one-pixel attack across multiple image
dimensions let us localize the regions of frequent successful one-pixel attacks at
the image space.
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1 Introduction
End-to-end Deep Learning pipelines (image in, classification out) have achieved sig-
nificant success in Medical Image Computing (MIC) across multiple scenarios, even
stretching to Computer-Aided Interventions (CAI) [6]. This success in comparison to
traditional methods (including based on learning) has hurried an AI-summer in Health-
care seen in the prevalence of Deep Learning-publications in the MICCAI community.
Political authorities have recognized this shift towards Deep Learning-based methods
and are taking action. In the United States, the FDA has embraced this change by approv-
ing AI devices for diabetic retinopathy detection [1] and is currently in the discussion
towards easing the approval process for AI-based medical software [7]. The European
Union, on the other hand, has introduced the General Data Protection Regulation, which
necessitates the right to explanation of any decisions taken by a computerized system.
Since researchers struggle to explain decisions by Deep Learning models, the under-
lying function is yet a Black Box in practice. Its analysis is hindered by the difficulty of
deriving and understanding the decision boundary. In fact, recent studies [2, 5, 8, 9, 11]
have shown that these Deep Learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples
– these are images which cause incorrect classifications despite either models predict-
ing with high certainty or being clear classifications to humans. Adversarial examples
are not understood as a consequence of the black-box-characteristic. They can even
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be as simple as only changing a single pixel leading to different classification results
(one-pixel-attacks). For medical applications, the exploitation of this vulnerability is
thoroughly analyzed by Finlayson et al. [3]. However, this vulnerability is largely ig-
nored across evaluations of Deep Learning in MIC and CAI.
Though impressive, the general example attacks shown by Finlayson et al. [3] ad-
dress the traditional image-in-diagnosis-out setting. However, real medical images and
annotations are complex further obscuring the situation and adding to the mystery –
for example complex image structure, confounding situations (device vendors, acqui-
sition parameters), non-conformity between radiologists, multi-class and multi-label
decisions. Without disentangling these factors it is impossible to understand adversarial
examples, which stem from Deep Learning only. Simplifications of MIC scenarios are
needed to draw systematic conclusions regarding adversarial examples. For example:
to consider segmentation masks rather than the real-world images (binary instead of
continuous pixel values) or to define decision boundaries in a closed form (which is not
available in MIC).
In this paper, we provide the first systematic analysis of one-pixel-attacks on con-
volutional neural networks (CNNs) in a simplified CAI application and provide a first
intuition of patterns. With inherent limits on the knowledge and processable size of both
the likely image space and a complete description of the decision boundary, it will be
impossible to analyze adversarial attacks due to the complexity of CNNs – even here
simplifications are needed. To break the problem down to its core, we a) simplify the
range of images (image space), b) train multiple classifiers and c) search exhaustively for
one-pixel adversarial examples. We consider the problem of instrument pose estimation
studied by Kügler et al. [6], who have ignored adversarial attacks, where the orienta-
tion of instruments is to be determined. To gain control over the image and annotation
complexity, we define a continuous generation manifold with a perfectly defined binary
decision boundary. From individual manifold coordinates, we generate binary images
at various dimensions with the instrument being simplified to a line for different levels
of discretization. We define all images that can be generated through this pipeline as
“possible images” and train multiple simple classifiers based on convolutional neural
networks with “ALL” these uniquely possible images. Finally, we exhaustively search
the space of all single pixel-flip adversarial candidates, identify successful attacks and
localize the regions of frequent successful one-pixel-attacks. The most surprisingly, the
overwhelming majority of attacks are localized at a distance of the instrument, which
implies the one-pixel-flip did not change the information of the image.
2 Related Work
Goodfellow et al.[5] demonstrate that standard image models exhibit a strange phe-
nomenom:most randomly chosen images from a data distribution are correctly classified
and yet are close to visually similar images that are incorrectly classified. By adding
some certain kind of pertubation to an image this behaviour can be reproduced on most
CNNs. A hypothesis on that behaviour is that neural network classifiers are too linear
in various regions of the input space.
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Fig. 1. Conceptual summary of the image classification problem.
Su et al. [10] specialize on so called ’one pixel attacks’. They show that even by
adding a pertubation with the size a single pixel to an image, the output of deep learning
networks can easily be altered.
Gilmer et al. [4] try to get an insight on adversarial examples by training different
neural networks on a synthetic dataset of two concentric spheres with different radii.
The idea is to classify whether a point belongs to one or the other sphere. Even though
the data manifold as well as the theoretical max margin boundary are clearly defined
and enough input is provided for networks to train on, adversarials can still be found
near correctly classified points.
3 Methods
We generate a custom dataset to study adversarial examples for image classification.
Using a exhaustive search, all one-pixel-flip candidate images are tested for misclassifi-
cation.
Analyzing the space I of images, we differentiate between images belonging to an
application (I∗f ⊂ I, often termed “natural images”) and images holding no information
on the application. By introducing a generation manifold M – a higher-level parameter
space describing all images possible for our application – we are able to describe all
features of the image relevant to our application.
For a systematic analysis of adversarial examples, we need a closed-form repre-
sentation of the decision boundary. Defining the decision boundary dependent on the
generation manifold allows us to determine the distance of an image to the decision
boundary in terms of the manifolds coordinates. The generation function f : M → I∗f
maps from the generation manifold to the image space I∗f restricted to images that can
be generated by f . Since all generations from a region around mi ∈ M lead to identical
images in I, those cases are in-differentiable, i.e. f is non-injective. In addition, since
not all images from I can be created by this function, some images x ∈ I do not have a
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Fig. 2. Generated images from a subset. The bar below indi-
cates the decision boundary. For the green range y = 1, y = 0
otherwise. Generated images are colorized for better contrast.
Dimensions 0.5° 1.0° 2.0°
16 × 16 394 280 170
32 × 32 2524 1394 716
48 × 48 5244 2790 1436
64 × 64 8116 4228 2158
80 × 80 10998 5676 2880
Table 1. Number of unique
images for different combi-
nations of image dimensions
and rotation stepsizes
corresponding coordinate m inM. For images that cannot be directly generated through
the generation function, but that are largely similar to images directly generated (e.g.
one-pixel attacks x ′i of image xi), the association to the corresponding mi is implicit
(dotted line). Some images x˜ will have the property of being equally similar to two dif-
ferentm even belonging to different classes. For these ambiguous images, no association
to a m or even a class can be found.
3.1 Dataset
With our chosen generation manifold M as (L, α), our generation function maps to
images of lines of varying length L and rotation α (see Fig. 2). Lines are centered on
the image center, leading to a scenario where images always differ in at least 2 pixels
because of symmetry. A line-like structure is being used, to keep the generationmanifold
as simple as possible. Finally, we define a simple decision boundary classifying images
into 2 categories, where y = 1 for α in the range from 0° to 40°, and y = 0 for all other
cases. The chosen range for α is arbitrary.
We generate 15 complete sets of all unique binary images X = I∗f for 15 different
generation functions f by different manifold discretization (only allowing α in steps of
0.5°, 1.0° and 2.0°) and image dimensions D × D (16 × 16, 32 × 32, 48 × 48, 64 × 64
and 80 × 80). The length L is varied between 12 Pixel and D − 2, where D is the width
and the height of the image. This procedure leads to varying numbers of unique images
(|X |) as described in Table 1.
3.2 Training
We train 5 models for each of the 15 synthetic combinations (Table 1), resulting in a total
of 75 trained networks. Training repititions were performed to average out the stochastic
properties of the training process.
Since we are looking at off-manifold images rather than the gereralization error of
the networks, there is no need for a testing set. Moreover, since we use every single
image in a subset (i.e. every possible image) for training, our models are not restricted
by the choice of training data. All models feature the same architecture only differing
in the dimensions of the input images. We design a simple network architecture with
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Fig. 3. Left to right: image from dataset for 0°; 2 confirmed exemplary adversarial candidates.
three layers: First, two 2D convolutional layers of size 3× 3 with 32 channels and ReLU
activation each followed by max pooling (stride 2) process the input. On this, a fully
connected layer with 128 units and ReLU activation is applied, followed by an output
layer with 2 units and a Sigmoid activation. We regulize by dropout (p = 0.25) just
before the fully connected layer.
For optimization, we use the Adam optimizer with recommended parameters (β1 =
0.9 and β2 = 0.999) and a learning rate of 0.001. Finally, binary crossentropy is used
as the loss function. We achieved an accuracy of 1.0 with all models indicating perfect
convergence on the training dataset.
3.3 Adversarial Data Creation
The goal of creating adversarial data is to identify whether our trained networks can be
fooled into predicting the wrong output y for a given image x. By flipping one pixel at a
time, we perform an exhaustive search of all combinations of all images in X (see Fig. 3
for examples). The total number of adversarial candidates Nadv = ND2, where N = |X |
and D being the width and length of the image. Unlike Su et al. [10], we brute-force
our way to a complete list of all possible adversarial examples instead of finding single
instances by optimization, which did not work for binary images.
4 Results
By testing the classification of all adversarial candidates, we found all networks to
be vulnerable to one-pixel-adversarial attacks. All experiments were performed on 5
networks, so all values are averages over 5 networks.
We evaluated the relative number of adversarial examples w.r.t. the adversarial
candidates. We also determined this ratio ADVcnt/(ND2) of actual adversarial examples
to adversarial candidates dependent on the angle rotation α (Advcnt/(nαD2), see Fig. 4)
and on the pixel-position in the image (see Fig. 5). These ratios can also be interpreted
as experimentally determined average likelihood of an image being adversarial given
the specific conditions.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the relationship of misclassifications at a particular
angle. Adversarial examples were only found around the decision boundary (α ≈ 0° or
α ≈ 40°). With an increase of the image dimension D the likelihood to find adversarial
examples decreases.
We created heatmaps, shown in figure 5, to display the spatial likelihoods for a flip
to cause a missclassification. The “X” represented the edges of lines from two images,
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Fig. 4.Comparison of average adversarial likelihood depending on the distance to decision bound-
ary. Plots show the areas around α = 0° and α = 40°. Note, in earlier versions (including the
published version=, the y-axis was labeled incorrectly.
which belonged to the values of α on the decision boundary, i.e. α = 0° and α = 40°.
Surprisingly, the highest likelihoods to cause an image to be confirmed as adversarial
were not situated at positions, where the discrimination between classes got harder from
an information perspective, but were removed from the edges, i.e. the overwhelming
majority of images was not ambiguous. Increasing the image dimension led to more
pronounced patterns and better overall robustness. This can also be seen in Fig. 6.
Finally, we analyzed whether the relationship between the relative number of ad-
versarial examples and the “possible redundancy” of the reconstructable manifold in-
formation in image space exits. The latter is the ratio of information contained in the
reconstructable manifold and the image. Higher “redundancy” seems to indicated a
strong relationship to increased robustness to adversarial attacks.
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Fig. 5. Heatmaps display the spatial likelihood for a flip to cause a misclassification, i.e. leading
to an adversarial example; the “X” represent edges of two images on the decision boundary, i.e.
α = 0° and α = 40°; interestingly, high probabilities are often found in regions removed from the
edges
Unlike other studies, these results were obtained for networks trained on “ALL”
possible images that can be generated from the generation manifold and achieved an
accuracy of 1.0.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides a systematic evaluation of one pixel adversarial attacks on con-
volutional neural networks. By leveraging a simple toy CAI scenario against a simple
yet perfect (accuracy 1.0) convolutional neural network, we find one-pixel-adversarial-
candidates with an astonishing regularity. These candidates are deliberately placed close
to but off the manifold training images are drawn from. In particular, we identify the
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Fig. 6. Information or Compression analysis
vulnerable regions to be close to the decision boundary and not explainable by loss of
informations caused by the introduction of the “attacking pixel”.
In Future Work, we will generalize these observations to toy examples derived from
other scenarios, increase the depth of the neural network and investigate causes for
adversarial examples.
The systematic analysis of adversarial examples presented in this paper initiates a
much needed process of understanding adversarial examples in medical images.
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